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6. — *A Brief Greek Syntax and Hints on Greek Accidence : with some Reference to Comparative Philology, and with Illustrations from various Modern Languages*. By the REV. FREDERIC W. FARRAR, M. A., F. R. S., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Honorable Fellow of King's College, London; one of the Masters of Harrow School; Author of "The Origin of Language," "Chapters on Language," etc. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. xxi., 204.

IF we had read only the first half of this work, we should have pronounced it a most instructive and even entertaining book. It is not a Greek grammar, still less a Greek syntax, in the ordinary sense; but rather a series of essays, on the subjects usually treated in Greek grammars, illustrated and enlivened by all the learning which the author brings from his studies in Comparative Philology. Those who wish to see what light has been thrown upon some of the ordinary principles of Greek grammar by the recent discoveries in the science of Language will find here much that will interest them, and incite them to further study. Mr. Farrar's purpose, as it is stated in his Preface, is most praiseworthy. He has tried "to eliminate all mere grammatical mysticism," and to make grammar really "interesting to every boy who has any aptitude for such studies, and is sufficiently advanced to understand them." His remarks on the "parrot-like" style of teaching scientific grammar, which does so much to bring grammar, and even the classical languages, into disrepute, cannot be too highly commended. In the Introduction, Mr. Farrar gives a brief sketch of the classification of languages, and states the position of Greek in the Indo-European group; he then explains the distinction between synthetic and analytic languages, showing the various elements of the longer compound forms in the Greek and Latin inflections. The "Hints on the Accidence" contain useful remarks on nearly every important point in that department, and are illustrated throughout by instances drawn from very many languages. The same is true of the earlier chapters on Syntax, especially of the remarks on the Tenses (pp. 110–127). No Greek scholar can read these without pleasure and profit, although, perhaps, he may occasionally dissent from some of the conclusions. The condensation of so much into so small a space shows that Mr. Farrar is master of his subject.

But when we come to the more difficult questions of Greek Syntax, on which Comparative Philology has no light to shed, and even Latin analogy, as it is commonly understood, is rather an impediment than a

help, we find a totally different state of things. Here, we regret to say, Mr. Farrar seems to be out of his department; and instead of writing like a master, he lapses into obscurity, and sometimes into hopeless confusion, which will sadly disappoint many who have found pleasure and instruction in his earlier chapters. He sounds a note of warning in his Preface, when he tells us of his indebtedness to "that immense repertory of Greek scholarship, the Greek Grammar of Mr. Jelf." Now, Jelf's Greek Grammar stands in about the same relation to Classic Philology as Dugald Stewart's famous chapter on the Origin of the Sanskrit (in which he tries to prove that Sanskrit is only "kitchen Greek") to Comparative Philology. If any one doubts this statement, we beg leave to refer him to the quotations from Jelf, given in the North American Review for October 1862 (pp. 317-331). This wonderful work, rich in truly comical blunders, has recently appeared in a revised edition, with its faults not softened, but intensified, and grounded (if possible) upon a broader foundation of ignorance than before; and when we see the respectful treatment which it receives from eminent scholars, — of which Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon and Mr. Farrar's Preface give striking examples, — we are confirmed in the opinion that Greek syntax is not the strong point in English scholarship. Dr. Donaldson, in his argument in favor of English "scholarship" as opposed to German *Gelehrsamkeit* (Classical Scholarship and Classical Learning, p. 148), tells us that "the Germans must learn from English philologers, if they ever learn, the ultimate refinements of Greek and Latin etymology and syntax," and that "a *perfectly accurate* acquaintance with Greek syntax is an essential requisite for success in the classical examination at Cambridge"; and no man ever criticised with more severity such inaccuracies as he detected in those who had not been trained at English universities, or drew more sweeping conclusions from such cases. And yet Dr. Donaldson himself, in his larger Greek Grammar (p. 597), makes a mistake far worse (on his own principles) than any that he criticises, when he gives ἡλθεν ἵνα ἀδικήσοι as an ordinary example of ἵνα and the optative in a final clause, — from which much less than a "perfectly accurate" acquaintance with Greek syntax would have saved him; for it is not a mere mistake in the use of words, but a blunder in regard to one of the fundamental rules of the language.

Mr. Farrar begins his discussion of the moods with a fatal heresy, in which he agrees with Dr. Donaldson and Mr. Jelf, that the subjunctive and optative are "not two moods, but one subjective mood," the subjunctive forms being its present and future tenses, and the optative forms being its past tenses. "The optative," he says (p. 130),

"is merely the subjunctive of the past or historic tenses. It carries with it a reference to the past." Again (p. 132), he says: "The past tenses of the Latin subjunctive are equivalent to the Greek optative." This "fundamental fact" the student is urged to master and to keep steadily in mind. How easy a task Mr. Farrar himself finds it merely to keep this "fundamental fact" steadily in mind, even after he has mastered it, appears from his remark (p. 132) that the future optative, "although it occurs, is merely a *chose de luxe*, because the whole mood [i. e. the 'subjunctive mood'] involves futurity, so that the present forms serve instead!" Thus within a single page we have the "fundamental fact" stated and denied. But let us suppose a student to escape this snare, and really to proceed to apply his "fact" to the Greek language. He will find the optative used in five ordinary constructions,—in wishes, in apodosis with *ἄν*, in conditional sentences (including the corresponding relative and temporal sentences), in clauses with *ἵνα*, *ὅπως*, *μή*, &c., and in the *oratio obliqua*. In clauses with *ἵνα*, &c., the optative is generally past, like the past tenses of the Latin subjunctive; but even in this strongest case it refers to the future if it happens to depend on an optative with *ἄν* or an optative in a wish (as in Æsch. Eumen. 298, *ἔλθοι, ὅπως . . . γένοιτο*, *may he arrive, that he may become*, &c.), showing that the reference to past time is not inherent in the optative. In general conditional sentences (sometimes called the "iterative construction," or that of "indefinite frequency"), the optative is past; but as it is future in all other conditional sentences, this establishes nothing as to the time denoted by the optative itself. In the *oratio obliqua* (the only other construction in which the optative is ever past), the optative exhibits the strongest marks of individuality, which are enough of themselves to vindicate its claim to the rank of a distinct mood. Here each tense, when the leading verb is past, represents the tense of the same name in the indicative or subjunctive; but as the correspondence to the indicative is the more prominent, and as one tense (the future) has no corresponding form in the subjunctive at all, we should find better ground here for considering the optative a secondary form of the indicative,—or rather, we cannot conceive how any one, after examining these constructions, could ever think of making the optative a secondary form of any mood at all.

With the constructions just mentioned all reference to the past in the optative ends, and all analogy to the past tenses of the Latin subjunctive disappears. In ordinary conditional sentences, *εἰ ποιοίη* is future, and equivalent to *si faciat*, never (in Attic Greek) to *si faceret*, the latter being represented by *εἰ ἐποίει*. The same is true of the corresponding relative and temporal sentences, although Mr.

Farrar (p. 153) omits all mention of the optative here as a regular construction, thus leaving out of his syntax and his theory all such sentences as *φάγοι ἂν ὁπότε βούλοιο*, *he would eat whenever he might please* (Xen. Mem. II. 1, 18), which are common from the time of Homer. In both classes of independent sentences above mentioned, the optative is regularly future, and there is no vestige of any reference to the past, *ποιοίη ἂν τοῦτο* and *εἴθε ποιοίη τοῦτο* being equivalent to *hoc faciat* (he would do this) and *utinam hoc faciat* (O that he may do this).

We need hardly add that Mr. Farrar leaves his student, who has been ordered to keep the "fundamental fact" steadily in mind, to extricate himself from this maze as best he can. As for himself, he keeps the fact in question steadily out of sight in all inconvenient places.

We cannot follow Mr. Farrar through the whole of his discussion, but must content ourselves with an examination of his statement of conditional sentences. Upon a right understanding of these depends much that follows. He explains the simple indicative, the subjunctive, and the optative in conditions as expressing respectively "possibility," "slight probability," and "complete uncertainty." Grammarians have commonly thought it necessary to attach some such general notions as these to the forms in question, and perhaps Mr. Farrar is as fortunate in his choice as most of his predecessors. Still, when he assigned to the indicative the idea of "possibility," which so many scholars had with equal confidence assigned to the subjunctive, we wonder that he did not suspect the soundness of the whole process. He certainly had a large variety to choose from. Between Zumpt's definition of the Latin present and perfect subjunctive (which here correspond to the Greek optative), that "they imply that the supposition does or may conform to fact," and Madvig's, that "they suppose a possible condition to take place in the present or future, but imply that it does not or will not take place,"—between Krüger's definition of the Greek subjunctive, that it implies "objective possibility," and Bäumlein's, that it expresses a "tendency to reality,"—the fancy has a wide range, and it would seem hard if every theory could not find a comfortable place. It is very easy to proceed with any one of these definitions to a given subjunctive, and to see (or imagine we see) some connection between the two, especially as Greek authors are kindly allowed by grammarians the liberty of *expressing* a thing as certain or uncertain even when they do not consider it so. But let a student attempt to apply Mr. Farrar's principles in turning simple English sentences into Greek, and see how he will fare. Any unprejudiced person would say that the conditions,

"If there is a polar sea," and "If Livingstone is still alive," fall very properly under Mr. Farrar's third class of "complete uncertainty"; although if "be" should be substituted for "is," a follower of Mr. Farrar would most certainly be compelled to use the subjunctive. Now, where is there the slightest hint in all Mr. Farrar's rules to show that both of these forms would be egregious blunders, and that the present indicative would be the only correct expression? The proverb, "If the sky falls (i. e. shall fall), we shall catch larks," would require the subjunctive or the future indicative in Greek; but imagine Mr. Farrar explaining one on the ground of "slight probability," and the other on that of "possibility"! The fact is, the subjunctive (or future) is required simply because the time is *future*, and the present indicative is required in the other two cases, simply because the time is *present*; and the more the matter is obscured by metaphysics, the harder will be the task of unfortunate boys who study Greek and Latin grammar, and of the more unfortunate teachers who try to guide them.

Mr. Farrar says very truly (p. 148) that the chief difficulty in understanding the matter arises from "the fluctuating and uncertain use of the English equivalents"; but he adds that we may accurately render the Greek indicative by "if" with the English indicative, and the Greek subjunctive by "if" with the English subjunctive. Nothing could illustrate the first part of this remark better than Mr. Farrar's own examples. He translates, *εἴ τι ἔχει*, *if he has anything*, and *ἐὰν τι ἔχῃ*, *if he have anything*. Now this assumes that all (including school-boys) are agreed on the exact meaning of *if he have* as distinguished from *if he has*. We have sought diligently to discover what distinction Mr. Farrar himself makes between them. If he takes for granted that the English subjunctive refers to future time, he has no authority for the assumption in either ancient or modern usage. If he goes back to the English of the New Testament, he will find *if he have* used to translate both *ἐὰν ἔχῃ* and *εἰ ἔχει*, and he will not find *if he has* at all. Thus, "If the light that is in thee *be* darkness," "If Satan *cast out* Satan," "If any man *have* not the spirit of Christ," are translated from *εἰ τὸ φῶς σκότος ἐστίν*, *εἰ ἐκβάλλει*, and *εἴ τις . . . οὐκ ἔχει*. Modern usage is just the reverse. The subjunctive has almost entirely disappeared from the language, except in the phrase *if he be*; and those who still use it seldom follow any consistent principle. Its disappearance is certainly to be regretted, as it is a mark of decay; but it is useless to deny that the vast majority of our best speakers and writers use *if he has* to represent both present and future, that is, as the equivalent of both *εἰ ἔχει* and *ἐὰν ἔχῃ* in Greek. The phrase *if he shall have*, which is often used in the New Testament to translate the

Greek subjunctive, is perhaps the most intelligible English representative of that form, as well as of the future indicative; but no one without further explanation — certainly no school-boy — would feel sure that *if he have anything* differs essentially from *if he has anything*. Thus Mr. Farrar explains one of the most important distinctions in the Greek language by referring his students to an English idiom which has no fixed meaning, and can hardly be intelligible to the majority of them.

As to Mr. Farrar's second example of the subjunctive, *ἐὰν ταῦτα λάξῃ, ἀμαρτάνει*, si hoc dicat, errat, *if he say this, he errs*, we confess we are more and more puzzled the more we examine it. If his translation means *if he (ever) says this, he (in all such cases) errs*, it may be justified; but even then it is an awkward sentence, requiring too much explanation to make it intelligible. But we fear Mr. Farrar did not mean to have his example thus understood. Certainly a learner, following Mr. Farrar's rules, would never think of giving it any other meaning than the obvious one, *if perchance he says this, he is in error*, — making the condition simply present, so that *ἐὰν λάξῃ* will differ from *εἰ λέγει* only by denoting "slight probability." If this is Mr. Farrar's meaning, the example is bad Greek, translated first into bad Latin and then into unintelligible English. No passage like it can be found in any classic author; it belongs to a class of constructions very common (unfortunately) in works on Greek composition, but unknown elsewhere.

We think we see Mr. Farrar's difficulty here, which prompted him to make up the example last quoted. He is trying to explain two distinct uses of the subjunctive on the same principle. In the most common construction, *ἐὰν τοῦτο ἔχῃ, δώσει*, *if he shall have this, he will give it*, the subjunctive refers to future time, and differs from *εἰ ἔχει* essentially in this; if it expresses more uncertainty than *εἰ ἔχει*, this is the result of its being future, not the cause of its being subjunctive. But there is another class of examples, — like *ἦν ἔγγυς ἄλθῃ θάνατος, οὐδεὶς βούλεται θνήσκειν*, *if death comes near, no one is ever willing to die*, — where the supposition is not future and not exactly present, but what may be called general; in fact, they are cases of the "iterative" construction which Mr. Farrar recognizes when it contains an optative (as in *εἴ τις ἀντίποι, εὐθὺς τεθνήκει*, *if any one refused, he was straightway put to death*), but fails entirely to see in its equally legitimate subjunctive form. It is a nicety in which the Greek differs from English and ordinary Latin to distinguish such expressions from the usual present suppositions; while the Latin is as consistent as the Greek in never confounding the ordinary future supposition with the present. It may be well for mature scholars to unite these two uses of the subjunctive on

some common ground, if any can be found; the chief task in instructing beginners must be to make the *distinction* understood. If now these general conditions are excluded as a distinct class, no one can fail to see that the Greek subjunctive with *ἐάν* simply refers to future time, a little less vividly than the future indicative with *εἰ* (a nearly equivalent but less common form), and more vividly than *εἰ* with the optative. The three forms, *εἰ ἐλεύσεται*, *ἐάν ἔλθῃ*, and *εἰ ἔλθοι*, correspond almost precisely to the English *if he shall go*, *if he goes* (referring to future time), and *if he should go*; although it is often best to translate the subjunctive by *if he shall go*, to make the futurity perfectly distinct. We ask any one whose ideas of English have not been perverted by false theories of Latin and Greek grammar, whether he ever dreams of any distinction between *if he shall go* and *if he should go*, except the one just stated. Indeed, the whole distinction made by Mr. Farrar between the subjunctive and optative in conditions, as well as the more common one of "uncertainty with" and "uncertainty without the prospect of decision," seems to us to involve the common error of mistaking a large species for the genus. If the optative is only a vaguer form of expression for essentially the same idea with the subjunctive, it will naturally be used when we wish to make a supposition in a less positive form, or when we feel less certainty as to its proving true; but these are not the only cases in which we may prefer the vaguer form, or we may use it without being able to assign any good reason for preferring it. Demosthenes says of Philip (Phil. I. § 11), referring to the prospect of his death, *ἂν οὗτός τι πάθῃ*, but in the very next sentence, referring to the very same thing, he says *εἴ τι πάθῃ*.

Perhaps Mr. Farrar's most unfortunate remark on this subject is on page 145, where he says: "N. B. When *εἰ* is used with the optative, the sense varies with the tense; e. g. *εἰ ταῦτα ποιοῖ*, *if he should be doing this* (now); *εἰ ταῦτα ποιήσῃ*, *if he should do this* (hereafter); *εἰ ταῦτα ποίησεν*, *if he did this*." It would be hard to crowd more mistakes into one remark than we have here. First, *εἰ ταῦτα ποιοῖ* in Attic Greek can mean either *if he should be doing this* (hereafter) or *if he ever did this* (in past time); but it cannot refer to present time. Secondly, *εἰ ταῦτα ποιήσῃ* differs from the preceding only in expressing a single or momentary act, and not at all in its time. Thirdly, *εἰ ταῦτα ποιήσῃ* is not Greek at all *in any sense* in an ordinary protasis, and can occur only in *oratio obliqua* after past tenses where *εἰ ποιήσῃ* would be used in the direct form. We will be charitable enough to believe, even after this disclosure, that in *εἰ τοῦτο λέξῃς*, *ἀμαρτήσῃ*, *if you say this*, *you will be in the wrong* (p. 147), *λέξῃς* is merely a misprint for *λέξεις*; but such a misprint in a leading example to a fundamental



rule should have been corrected before the book fell into the hands of students.

We have felt it to be our duty to call attention to what we believe to be an unscientific treatment of some of the most important subjects discussed in Mr. Farrar's volume, because other parts of the work are of such undoubted merit that it will be widely circulated in England and in this country. If we could presume to make a suggestion to Mr. Farrar, we should advise him to publish the first 127 pages of his *Syntax* as a work by itself, or, at least, to submit the questions that arise in Greek syntax to the same scientific investigation which he is accustomed to use in *Comparative Philology*, and which shows itself so conspicuously in the earlier parts of the work before us.

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7.—*Rapport sur le Progrès et la Marche de la Physiologie générale en France.* Par M. CLAUDE BERNARD. Paris: Hachette. 1867. pp. 237.

THIS handsome volume is one of the series of Reviews of the present *status* of the several natural sciences, which M. Duruy has invited the leading scientific men of France to prepare. Few kinds of books are apt to be so uniformly delightful reading as those essays which great students of nature have from time to time allowed themselves to make, upon the "philosophy" of their respective branches of research. M. Bernard's book belongs on the whole to this class, and partakes of its inherent charm, though in a less degree to our mind than the delightful *Introduction à la Médecine Expérimentale*, which he published a couple of years ago, — probably because it is more "immersed in matter." The true refreshment, to a hard-working student, is to be able, not to retire wholly out of sight of the scene of his labors, but to banish for a time their importunate details. The simple cleansing of the person, as it were, from the laboratory dirt, and washing the dust out of weary eyes, is an agreeable release; and so is the relaxation of the mind from that high-strung attitude of vigilance, suspicion, and suspended judgment in which the more purely business hours of an investigator are necessarily passed. But when, in addition to this, he may still linger in the neighborhood of the darling branch of learning, define its problem and its method, continue by the imagination lines of research just opened, leap to their ideal end without anxiously toiling through all the steps that lie between, the exercise is not only a diversion from past labors, but becomes a salutary play, which reinvigorates and disposes for future exertions. A large portion of M. Bernard's